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Of  these  four  published  papers  submitted  as  part  of  the  requirement  for  the  
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Bentall  and  P.  A.  Garety  (eds).  Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press:  281-­‐‑301)  was  
drafted  by  the  candidate,  with  comments  by  McGuire  and  joint  revisions  from  
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and  P.  Fusar-­‐‑Poli  (2012)  Current  Pharmaceutical  Design  18(4):  596-­‐‑605)  was  
drafted  by  the  candidate,  with  comments  by  Fusar-­‐‑Poli  and  joint  revisions  
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   7	  




Professor  Lisa  Bortolotti  
  
  








Professor  Philip  McGuire  
     





The  papers  included  in  the  thesis,  and  summarized  in  this  covering  document,  
were  selected,  in  discussion  with  my  supervisor,  Dr.  Roessler,  from  papers  I  
have  published  in  the  philosophy  of  psychiatry.  In  parallel  to  this  
philosophical  work,  I  have  worked  clinically  as  a  psychiatrist  and  
academically  as  a  research  psychiatrist.    My  clinical  work  has  largely  been  
working  with  Early  Intervention  Services,  both  in  South  London  and  in  
Coventry  and  Warwickshire,  and  this  work  has  been  acting  as  a  psychiatrist  
in  clinical  teams  who  work  with  young  people  who  may  either  be  at  risk  of  
developing  a  psychotic  illness,  or  are  in  the  earliest  stages  of  such  an  illness.    
My  empirical  work  has  been  in  the  same  clinical  group  and  has  used  
functional  neuroimaging  and  cognitive  neuropsychology  to  characterize  those  
at  risk  of  psychosis  and  to  chart  the  onset  of  psychosis  and  the  formation  of  
delusions.    As  required  by  the  university  guidelines,  a  full  list  of  publications,  
both  empirical  and  philosophical,  is  detailed  in  appendix  1.    The  papers  
included  in  the  thesis  hence  parallel  many  of  these  clinical  and  empirical  
interests:  papers  2  and  4,  in  particular,  examine  the  role  neuroimaging  may  
play  in  studying  delusions  and  relate  the  prodromal  phase  of  psychosis  to  
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both  the  neurodevelopmental  and  continuum  models  of  psychosis.    Paper  3  is  
one  of  two  papers  written  with  Lisa  Bortolotti  drawing  on  Richard  Moran’s  
work  and  examining  delusions.  Paper  1  is  perhaps  the  paper  least  connected  
to  my  empirical  and  clinical  work  as  has  a  wider  focus  and  tries  to  examine  
what  mental  illnesses  are  and  to  begin  to  describe  a  position  Lisa  Bortolotti  
and  I  later  expanded  on  and  referred  to  as  ‘psychological  realism’,  with  Paper  
2  being  a  case  example  of  this  account  being  applied  to  a  particular  area  of  
psychopathology,  namely  delusions.    The  papers  form  a  progression  with  
Paper  1  outlining  a  general  conception  of  mental  disorder,    Paper  2  being  a  
case  study  of  this  approach  specifically  in  the  area  of  delusion.    Paper  3  takes  
the  example  of  thought  insertion  and  develops  ideas  from  Paper  2  that  reason  
giving  is  a  crucial  feature  that  helps  highlight  what  is  pathological  about  
certain  experiences.    Paper  4  brings  together  the  philosophical  concerns  
regarding  a  wholly  neuroscientific  conception  of  psychopathology,  and  how  
this  is  of  clinical  and  scientific  relevance  when  we  use  psychopathology  to  
demarcate  the  various  stages  of  psychotic  experience  and  illness.  
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Paper  1:  Taxonomy  and  Ontology  in  Psychiatry  
This  paper  was  an  early  publication  in  philosophy  and  psychiatry  and  doesn’t  
explicitly  focus  on  psychosis  or  schizophrenia  unlike  the  other  papers,  but  
rather  the  nature  of  mental  disorders.    However,  given  my  own  empirical  and  
clinical  work  with  psychotic  illnesses,  these  are  drawn  on  as  examples  to  
illustrate  points  in  the  argument.  The  main  claim  of  the  paper  is  that  mental  
disorders  are  real  and  that  an  enriched  conception  of  reality  is  required  to  do  
justice  to  the  complexity  of  the  phenomenon.    The  paper  argues  for  parallels  
in  the  literature  on  the  nature  of  mental  disorder  with  the  problem  of  
intentionality  McDowell  addresses  in  Mind  and  World.    The  paper  
distinguishes  between  three  views  in  the  philosophy  of  psychiatry  literature  
and  concludes  by  enriching  a  conception  of  realism  with  the  understanding  of  
the  importance  of  conceptual  capacities  in  characterizing  mental  disorder.    I  
argue  that  these  existing  accounts  of  mental  illness  do  not  wholly  chart  the  
logical  space  of  the  options  available  and  offer  an  alternate  account  that  might  
be  termed  naïve  realism.    This  view  can  be  summarized  in  the  claim  that  
mental  disorders  are  real,  and  that  they  are  characterized  in  psychological  
terms,  and  this  characterization  does  nothing  to  hinder  their  objectivity.    
Further,  this  allows  mental  disorder  and  psychopathology  to  remain  areas  
where  research  can  be  carried  out,  and  clinical  expertise  developed,  within  an  
expanded  notion  of  objectivity  and  science.  
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The  paper  summarizes  various  writers’  ways  of  conceptualizing  mental  
disorder  and  attempts  to  group  such  accounts  into  three  broad  categories  –  
‘essentialist/realist’,  ‘anti-­‐‑essentialist/pragmatic’  and  ‘eliminativist’.  In  this  
survey    ‘realism’  is  used  in  a  traditional  sense  to  denote  views  that  both  argue  
for  the  existence  of  mental  illness  and  that  the  existence  of  such  illnesses  is  
independent  of  the  beliefs,  linguistic  practices,  and  conceptual  schemes  of  
people.    However,  notions  of  belief  may  be  integral  to  the  characterization  of  
a  given  disorder,  for  example,  the  role  delusions  play  in  defining  psychotic  
illnesses.    ‘Realism’  is  the  term  used  to  group  writers  who  endorse  ontological  
and  scientific  realism  with  respect  to  mental  disorder.    The  paper  opens  with  
a  brief  historical  overview  of  the  metaphysics  of  illness  and  disease,  
contrasting  Platonic  conceptions  of  illness,  with  more  contemporary  
Virchowian  accounts  as  illnesses  as  ‘disease-­‐‑as-­‐‑lesion’,  i.e.  illnesses  being  
understood  as  derangements  of  normal  physiology  or  anatomy,  rather  than  as  
autonomous  agents  that  enter  the  body  from  without.    This  model  of  illness  
from  Virchow  is  crucial  as  the  nature  of  illness  becomes  linked  to  the  co-­‐‑
dependence  of  pathological  process  and  normal  physiology  and  anatomy.  
This  notion  from  Virchow  is  a  spur  to  what  has  been  referred  to  as  the  ‘first  
biological  psychiatry’  of  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  and  
Greisinger’s  view  that  mental  illnesses  were  diseases  of  the  brain,  as  well  as  
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the  successes  of  Alzheimer  and  the  identification  of  Treponema  pallidum  as  the  
aetiological  agent  in  neurosyphillis  .    However,  the  scientific  optimism  of  
Greisinger  and  his  contemporaries  was  short  lived,  coming  to  an  end  in  the  
1880’s,  with  successors  characterizing  disorders  by  clinical  course  and  
outcome  (Kraepelin)  or  by  psychological  understanding  of  onset  (Jaspers)  
rather  than  neuropathology.    The  paper  argues  that  there  has  been  a  return  to  
Greisinger’s  view  of  mental  illness  with  the  advances  in  neuroscience  and  
technology,  and  the  strength  of  neuropsychiatry  as  an  explanatory  framework.      
  
The  paper  charts  the  existing  answers  to  the  question  of  what  mental  
disorders  are.    Reviewing  recent  writings,  the  ‘realist’  or  ‘essentialist’  position  
is  described  as  one  that  views  the  existing  categories  of  mental  disorder  and  
psychopathology  as  being  real,  existing,  kinds  in  nature,  discrete,  and  being  
amenable  to  scientific  study  such  that  each  will  have  some  ‘essence’,  in  that  
their  properties  will  be  independent  of  the  linguistic  and  cognitive  states  of  
individuals  who  both  study,  treat,  and  suffer  from,  such  disorders.    In  these  
writings,  realist  positions  are  also  often  seen  to  be  essentialist  but  this  need  
not  be  the  case:  a  non-­‐‑essentialist  realism  about  mental  illness  may  be  possible.  
Both  phenomenological  and  biological  approaches  can  demonstrate  a  realist  
and  essentialist  position.  These  invariant  properties,  or  essence,  could  be  
neuroscientific  (for  example,  a  particular  neurochemical  change)  or  
experiential  (for  example,  a  particular  subjective  psychological  state).    Despite  
	   13	  
the  failures  of  research  to  clearly  identify  such  invariant  features  of  disorders,  
many  psychiatric  theorists,  both  historically  and  contemporaneously,  have  
been  scientific  optimists.      Although  they  believe  in  the  existence  of  such  
essential  properties  defining  mental  illnesses,  they  are  frequently  willing  to  
admit  that  we  do  not  know  what  they  are  at  present  but  that  they  will  be  
discovered,  pending  appropriate  scientific  advances,  in  the  future.  This  
realist-­‐‑essentialist  stance  is  prevalent  in  the  writings  of  both  biological  
psychiatrists,  as  well  as  those  from  the  phenomenological  and  hermeneutic  
traditions.    The  former  advocated  a  discrete  genetic  change  or  neural  circuit  
alteration  underpinning  the  disorder,  whereas  the  phenomenologist  would  
offer  a  particular  subjective  experience,  such  as  an  alteration  of  the  Husserlian  
‘natural  attitude’.  The  biological  essentialist  position  is  compelling  as  it  offers  
a  picture  of  certainty  and  clarity  and  the  possibility  of  progress.    However,  to  
date,  this  approach  has  largely  failed  and  there  are  increasing  concerns  that  
the  assumption  that  the  entities  of  the  existing  psychiatric  taxonomies  will  be  
amenable  to  such  an  analysis  is  extremely  unlikely.    These  concerns  coalesced  
prior  to  the  publication  of  the  5th  editions  of  the  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  
Manual  (DSM-­‐‑5)  (but  several  years  after  the  paper  was  written)  with  the  
National  Institute  of  Mental  Health  (NIMH)  arguing  for  researchers  to  study  
psychological  states  more  amenable  to  scientific  investigation  rather  than  
those  employed  by  the  American  Psychiatric  Association  (APA).      The  
phenomenological  essentialist  position  is  also  criticized  as  it  can  draw  on  
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Husserl’s  idea  of  the  eidetic  reduction  and  hence  relies  on  mental  disorders  
having  clear  criteria  and  being  like  the  entities  of  mathematics  and  geometry,  
a  view  that  is  not  consistent  with  the  empirical  and  clinical  findings  of  
psychiatry.    
  
The  second  perspective  that  seems  to  be  dominant  in  the  literature  is  one  I  
termed  ‘anti-­‐‑essentialist’  or  ‘pragmatic’  –  here  the  taxonomy  of  disorder  is  not  
primarily  designed  to  capture  and  describe  nature,  but  rather  to  address  
certain  concerns  and  purposes,  some  of  which  may  be  in  conflict.    These  
approaches  can  be  seen  as  ‘instrumentalist’.  There  may  well  be  empirical  
generalizations  about  such  groupings,  such  as  prognosis  and  response  to  
various  treatments,  but  these  are  not  linked  to  essential  characteristics  of  the  
disorder.    This  approach  is  in  some  ways  appealing  as  it  makes  no  major  
claims  regarding  the  metaphysics  of  mental  disorder.    The  problem  with  it  is  
that  it  can  lead  to  a  view  where  the  reality  of  mental  illness  is  doubted,  the  
suffering  of  those  with  psychological  distress  is  denied,  where  expertise  and  
progress  is  problematic,  and  other  ways  of  dealing  with  people  with  
psychiatric  disorders  become  dominant,  such  as  criminalization.    The  third  
approach,  and  one  that  perhaps  can  be  seen  to  link  to  recent  views  of  the  
NIMH  and  the  RDoc  criteria  mentioned  above,  is  an  eliminativist  approach  to  
the  entities  of  psychiatry.    Analogously  to  the  work  of  the  Churchlands  on  
folk  psychology,  this  view  holds,  unlike  the  realist  position,  that  the  entities  
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that  make  up  current  psychiatric  taxonomies  are  a  fiction,  albeit  useful  for  a  
time,  and  those  entities  may  be  eliminated  when  the  biology  of  mental  illness  
is  wholly  described.    Primacy  will  be  given  to  neurological  accounts  and  the  
entities  that  make  up  such  accounts.  The  position  of  NIMH  is  rather  more  
nuanced  than  the  ‘eliminative  mindless’  psychiatry  position  described  by  
Kendell  –  the  NIMH  advocate  a  stepping  backwards  so  as  to  continue  
forward.    Rather  than  continuing  optimistically  with  the  categories  we  have,  
as  the  realist  essentialists  do,  we  step  back  to  functions  such  as  attention  and  
memory,  for  example,  and  study  them  using  the  full  resources  of  
neuroscience  and  genetics,  prior  to  re-­‐‑conceptualising  psychiatric  illnesses  
with  these  simpler,  atomistic  elements.    Problems  for  the  eliminative  mindless  
view  are  that,  neurologically,  psychiatric  illnesses  are  ‘silent’.    For  many  
neurological  conditions,  they  present  with  symptoms  that  cause  distress  or  
disability  such  as  headache,  weakness,  problems  in  gait,  sensory  disturbance,  
change  of  vision  etc.  Psychiatric  disorders  are  typically  not  associated  with  
such  motor  and  sensory  problems,  but  instead  manifest  either  in  one’s  own  
awareness  of  a  psychological  change,  or  others’  awareness  of  that  change  
(where  insight  is  lost).      Hence,  for  an  eliminative  mindless  psychiatry  to  work,  
then  a  new  vocabulary  would  need  to  be  developed,  that  allows  help  seeking  
to  be  obtained  via  the  patient  using  the  language  of  neuroscience.    For  RDoC  
the  current  taxonomy  of  psychiatry  may  be  rebuilt  such  that  the  new  
symptom  complexes  generated  may  be  very  different  from  what  has  come  
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before.    Hence,  a  patient  who  reports  feeling  ‘depressed’  will  need  their  
experiences  to  be  re-­‐‑described  in  the  new  terminology.    For  the  eliminative  
mindless  psychiatrist,  this  process  of  translation  into  the  new  idiom  is  harder  
given  the  elimination  of  folk  psychology  vocabulary,  and  no  assumption  that  
such  vocabulary  maps  neatly  onto  neural  states.  
  
Thus,  the  three  main  answers  to  the  nature  of  mental  disorders  are  found  to  
have  problems,  yet  there  remains  a  need  to  have  a  view  regarding  mental  
illness.  I  then  review  the  purpose  and  function  of  classification  in  science,  
medicine  and  psychiatry,  and  relate  this  to  classical  taxonomic  strategies  
utilizing  natural  kinds,  such  as  the  periodic  table  of  elements.    However,    
rather  than  disorders  being  defined  by  a  single  criterion  (such  as  atomic  
number  for  the  periodic  table),  they  may  have  several  robust  criteria  used  to  
determine  their  identity.    I  use  this  approach  to  characterize  the  classical  
essentialist  position.    The  paper  moves  to  discuss  the  work  of  Kendell.    
Kendell  argues  that  the  nature  of  mental  disorder  is  not  homogenous:  he  
suggests  that  some  mental  disorders  may  be  able  to  be  explained  by  a  
classical  taxonomic  strategy,  i.e.  that  some  disorders  will  have  a  clear  
demarcating  criterion  or  criteria  that  allows  them  to  be  crisply  demarcated  
from  other  disorders,  and  grouped  by  the  nature  of  these  criteria,  whereas  
other  disorders  may  not  be  like  this.  Kendell  suggests  the  disorders  that  are  
grouped  as  dementias  as  possible  candidates  for  such  an  approach,  others  
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may  be  natural  kinds,  and  amenable  to  this  strategy,  but  we  will  only  know  
this  when  scientific  advances  into  the  aetiology  and  pathophysiology  of  such  
disorders  are  made,  and  hence  such  disorder  are  seen  to  be  natural  kinds.    
Kendell’s  approach  is  broadly  optimistic,  as  mentioned  above,  in  that  he  sees  
that  this  may  be  achievable  for  all  disorders,  but  there  is  the  thought  that  
there  may  be  some  disorders,  as  currently  characterized,  where  progress  is  
unable  to  be  made  in  terms  of  demarcating  them  using  robust  criteria,  and  
hence  elimination  or  redescription  may  be  required  for  those  illnesses  to  be  
classified  in  a  classical,  natural  kind,  manner.  
  
I  The  essentialist  realist  strategy  has  failed  empirically,  yet  there  are  also  
conceptual  reasons  why  such  an  approach  will  be  unable  to  capture  the  
important  features  of  mental  disorder.  Additionally  to  biology,  what  is  
needed  for  an  illness  to  be  an  illness  and  the  paper  reviews  some  of  the  work  
by  Wakefield  on  ‘harmful  dysfunction’.    A  particular  point  in  Wakefield’s  
argument  is  picked  up:  namely,  that  a  strength  of  his  approach  is  that  it  
connects  psychiatric  illness  to  medical  illnesses  more  generally.    However,  I  
suggest  that  it  is  not  clear  why  we  need  to  rely  on  notions  from  physical  
illness  to  describe  mental  illness:  the  term  disorder  could  still  be  used,  but  
applied  to  the  realm  of  the  mental,  rather  than  the  physical.    Hence,  there  
would  be  no  need  for  disorder  to  be  based  upon  ‘disturbed  biological  
mechanisms’,  but  instead  on  psychological  processes  and  states,  that  need  not  
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be  linked  to  biology.    One  could  have  the  notion  of  disorder  of  the  mental  as  
an  autonomous  realm.    Wakefield’s  work  is  important  as  it  underlines  the  
importance  of  ‘harmful’  and  how  that  needs  to  be  cashed  out  for  a  state  of  
affairs  to  be  an  illness,  but  it  need  not  be  the  case  that  the  disorder  has  to  be  
based  on  biological  mechanisms  going  awry  –  the  disturbance  could  be  at  
alternate  level  of  description,  at  the  psychological  level,  and  we  should  resist  
the  assumption  that  psychiatric  illnesses  need  be  analogues  of  medical  
illnesses.  
  
Returning  to  natural  kinds,  the  paper  reviews  the  work  of  Cooper,  Thornton  
and  Haslam,  and  particularly  their  analysis  of  the  ‘kinds  of  kinds’  that  may  
make  up  the  psychiatric  taxonomy,  including  the  idea  of  ‘partial  kinds’,  (cases  
of  disease  that  may  be  similar  to  one  to  one  another  in  some,  but  not  all,  
characteristics),  and  that  of  cases  of  some  disorders  which  do  not  share  a  
fundamental  property  in  common  that  may  be  amenable  to  natural  scientific  
study.    Haslam  expands  Cooper’s  lists  of  kinds  further  with  non-­‐‑kinds,  
practical  kinds,  fuzzy  kinds,  and  discrete  kinds.    Haslam  and  Cooper  agree  
with  the  thought  that  however  well  symptoms  and  signs  co-­‐‑segregate  as  
syndromes,  there  should  be  no  assumption  that  there  is  a  discrete  natural  
substance  or  change  that  underlies  such  a  pattern.    Despite  the  prevailing  
view  that  natural  kinds  may  be  infrequent  in  psychiatry,  the  classical  
taxonomic  is  appealing  and  considered  more  scientific  and  objective  than  
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other  approaches,  and  drawing  on  Thornton’s  work,  I  examine  the  notion  of  
objectivity  in  relation  to  psychosocial,  ethical  and  legal  concepts,  and  the  
work  of  Bernard  Williams  and  John  McDowell.    This  examination  of  
objectivity  is  a  crucial  step  in  the  paper  as  it  allows  an  expanded  logical  space  
to  be  developed  that  enables  an  enriched  naturalism  to  be  developed  in  
relation  to  mental  disorders.    McDowell  examines  the  ‘absolute  conception  of  
the  world’  described  by  Williams  in  his  book  on  Descartes,  a  reality  that  is  
independent  of  any  thought  or  experience.    The  paper  discusses  McDowell’s  
critique  of  Williams  as  leaving  us  with  a  notion  of  science  and  objectivity  that  
can  be  abstract  and  lacks  determinate  content.    McDowell’s  critique  of  the  
‘absolute  conception  of  the  world’,  coupled  with  the  importance  of  ‘extra-­‐‑
biological’  notions  such  as  ‘harmful’  and  ’dysfunction’,  and  the  resistance  to  
making  psychiatric  illness  identical  to  medical  illness,  are  the  key  ideas  that  
allow  an  extra  logical  space  to  be  developed  in  thinking  about  what  mental  
disorders  are.  
  
Before  elaborating  on  these  ideas  of  objectivity  and  science  with  reference  to  
Williams  and  McDowell,  the  paper  explains  the  phenomenological  approach  
to  nosology  and,  as  mentioned  above,  argues  that  this  approach  shares  some  
of  the  essentialist  goals  of  a  realist  biological  psychiatry.    Both  approaches  
seek  to  identify  a  single  defining  essence  of  a  disorder,  with  some  viewing  
phenomenology  as  a  necessary  step  to  clarify  the  psychological  data  prior  to  
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its  reduction  to  biology.  The  work  of  Parnas  and  Zahavi  is  drawn  upon  as  an  
example  of  phenomenological  psychiatry  and  as  an  example  of  an  approach  
that  seeks  to  determine  the  subjective  essence  of  a  mental  illness,  prior  to  it  
being  reduced  to  biology.    The  paper  surveys  their  proposed  method,  in  
particular  examining  the  seeming  conflation  of  Weberian  Ideal  Types  with  
Husserlian  Essences,  and  how  empirical  data  relates  to  both  of  these  
approaches.    The  section  concludes  that  most  mental  disorders  are  not  
amenable  to  Husserlian  eidetic  analysis,  and  hence,  this  method  cannot  be  
assumed  to  generate  an  essence  in  any  ontology,  and  that  a  more  Weberian  
approach  lacks  the  essentialism  desired  by  the  phenomenologists.    
Schizophrenia  may  be  an  ideal  type  but  lacks  the  crisp  and  discrete  
boundaries,  and  invariant  and  essential  properties,  which  are  required  for  the  
eidetic  reduction.  
  
The  paper  turns  to  the  roles  of  values  and  how  psychiatric  classificatory  
systems  are  created,  and  returns  to  McDowell  and  a  non-­‐‑foundational  
conception  of  objectivity  that  is  not  inconsistent  with  values,  perspectives,  
history,  and  local  concerns.    Given  the  view  of  the  paper  that  biology  and  
essentialism  will  only  go  so  far,  the  paper  closes  by  examining  how  far  
biology  may  be  able  to  go  in  characterizing  psychiatric  disorders  and  
psychopathology  and  explores  the  notion  of  an  ‘eliminative  mindless  
psychiatry’,  described,  but  not  endorsed,  by  Kendell.    The  paper  argues,  with  
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McDowell,  that  to  do  full  credit  to  studying  mental  illnesses,  natural  
phenomena,  we  should  not  be  constrained  by  the  scope  and  methods  of  
natural  sciences.    Rather,  we  need  an  expanded  conception  of  nature  that  
allows  reasons  and  norms,  the  space  of  reasons,  to  be  as  real  and  objective  as  
any  construct  of  natural  science.      I  suggest  that  thinking  on  the  nosology  and  
taxonomy  of  psychiatry  parallels  the  problems  McDowell  addresses  in  his  
Mind  and  World,  with  coherentism  approximating  to  pragmatism/anti-­‐‑
essentialism,  the  ‘Myth  of  the  Given’  to  essentialist/realist  views,  and  bald  
naturalism  to  identity  reduction  or  Kendell’s  Churchlandian  eliminative  
mindless  psychiatry.    The  solution  to  the  nature  of  mental  disorders  is  
McDowell’s:  a  reminder  of  the  second  nature  and  conceptual  capacities,  and  
an  enriched  conception  of  realism.    Hence,  the  paper  concludes  with  a  realist  
conception  of  mental  disorder,  but  one  that  has  broken  away  with  the  
traditional  picture  of  realism.    This  approach  could  be  termed  a  naïve  realism.    
Mental  disorders  are  real  and  are  described  using  the  terms  of  common  sense  
psychology  because  such  terms  have  explanatory  power,  with  such  
explanatory  power  not  being  attainable  by  a  purely  biological  description.    
Someone  with  anxiety  will  tend  to  remove  himself  or  herself  from  a  feared  
object,  a  patient  with  an  auditory  hallucination  may  reply  to  that  voice  or  
carry  out  what  the  voice  asks  of  him  or  her.  Mental  disorders  are  defined  by  
psychological  terms  and  will  manifest  as  patterns  of  change  in  conceptual  
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capacities  and  the  space  of  reasons,  patterns  that  are  real,  stable  and  based  
upon  the  shared  understanding  we  have  of  rationality  and  reason.  
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Paper  2:  Imaging  and  delusions  
  
This  paper  is  part  of  a  volume  examining  persecutory  delusions  and  
specifically  deals  with  how  neuroimaging  can  help  the  understanding  and  
study  of  persecutory  delusions.    The  paper  can  be  seen  as  an  illustrative  case  
example  of  the  approach  taken  in  Paper  1,  when  applied  to  a  specific  area  of  
psychopathology.  The  central  claim  of  the  paper  is  that  the  prior  strategies  of  
cognitive  neuropsychiatry  that  have  been  employed  successfully  to  study  
other  areas  of  psychopathology  are  likely  to  fail  when  studying  delusions.    
Cognitive  neuropsychiatry,  as  described  by  Halligan  and  David,  is  an  
example  of  a  sophisticated  realist  conception  of  mental  disorder  as  discussed  
in  Paper  1.    Cognitive  neuropsychiatry  views  the  symptoms  of  mental  
disorder  as  consequent  upon  changes  in  normal  cognitive  processes,  and  in  
turn,  views  those  processes  as  being  located  in  a  certain  anatomical  area  of  the  
brain.    An  example  of  a  cognitive  neuropsychiatric  approach  would  be  to  
explain  psychopathy  as  due  to  a  change  in  normal  processes,  such  as  the  
individual’s  response  to,  and  recognition  of,  facial  affects,  and  how  those  
processes  may  be  differentially  mediated  in  the  brain  in  those  with  the  
disorder.    
  
Delusions  have  been  resistant  to  this  approach  with  studies  either  focusing  on  
demarcated  experiences  (that  may  then  be  subject  to  delusional  elaboration)  
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such  as  the  experience  of  a  passivity  of  a  limb,  or  examining  reasoning  tasks  
purportedly  linked  to  the  genesis  and/or  maintenance  of  delusions,  such  as  
the  ‘jumping  to  conclusions’  reasoning  style.  A  key  reason  for  the  difficulty  in  
the  study  of  delusions  is  the  variety  of  psychological  continua,  many  of  which  
are  normatively  constituted,  that  are  utilized  in  thinking  about  delusions.    
Psychological  continua  are  variables  whose  range  of  values  can  be  described  
using  continuous  statistics,  so  variables  that  are  continuous  will  have  a  mean,  
a  standard  deviation,  and  the  frequency  of  either  extreme  of  the  distribution  
being  less  common.    Many  disorders  in  medicine  are  based  on  continua,  such  
as  hypertension  with  the  variable  being  blood  pressure,  or  diabetes  mellitus,  
where  the  variable  is  blood  glucose.    Delusion,  however,  relies  on  how  the  
extremes  of  several  of  these  continua,  for  example  unfoundedness,  conviction,  
plausibility,  distress  inter-­‐‑relate  and  demarcate  delusions  from  other  mental  
states.    In  addition  to  several  continua  being  considered  for  delusions  to  be  
identified,  the  continua  themselves  are  not  clearly  marked  by  reference  to  a  
biological  fact  (such  as  the  concentration  of  blood  glucose)  but  are  determined  
by  reference  to  normative  considerations,  and  hence  cannot  be  reduced  to  a  
biological  variable.  This  is  a  crucial  issue  for  a  wholly  brain-­‐‑based  cognitive  
neuropsychiatric  account  of  delusion.  Delusions,  however,  are  often  more  
complicated  than  even  this:  rather  than  being  the  endorsement  of  a  given  
propositional  attitude  (“The  FBI  believe  I  am  Osama  bin  Laden”),  those  who  
are  deluded  experience  a  radical  shift  in  their  experience  of  the  world,  
	   25	  
themselves,  and  of  meaning  and  causality.    Their  whole  experience  is  
coloured  by  the  delusion.    
  
To  understand  the  technical  aspects  of  cognitive  neuropsychiatry  and  
functional  neuroimaging,  the  paper  opens  with  a  brief  review  of  the  physics  
and  physiology  that  underpins  functional  magnetic  resonance  imaging  (fMRI)  
and  how  the  technique  has  been  used  to  great  effect  to  study  another  key  
symptom  of  psychosis,  namely  auditory  hallucinations.    The  research  
paradigm  of  ‘cognitive  neuropsychiatry’  is  introduced  as  an  approach  that  
explicitly  approaches  psychopathology  as  a  change  in  normal  cognitive  
neuropsychological  function  and  in  turn,  tries  to  relate  these  functions  to  
anatomical  areas  in  the  brain.    Traditionally,  fMRI  works  either  by  ‘capturing’  
the  psychopathological  symptom  by  the  participant  button-­‐‑pressing  in  the  
scanner  when  the  experience  is  occurring  or  by  examining  the  neural  
correlates  of  a  task  thought  to  reflect  a  process  linked  to  the  mechanism  which  
produces  the  symptom.    An    example  of  the  former  would  be  that  of  a  patient  
who  has  frequent  auditory  verbal  hallucinations.    ‘Capturing’  would  consist  
of  that  patient  entering  the  MRI  machine,  undergoing  the  scan  and  being  
instructed  to  button-­‐‑press  whenever  their  voice  occurred.  This  allows  a  time  
series  of  the  experiences  to  be  created  that  can  be  used  to  interrogate  the  fMRI  
data  such  that  can  see  the  neural  correlates  of  when  the  experience  occurred,  
activations  of  the  brain,  as  measured  by  BOLD,  are  linked  by  temporal  co-­‐‑
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occurrence  with  the  timing  of  the  experience  under  investigation.    A  more  
frequently  used  approach  of  using  fMRI  to  study  psychopathology  is  to  first,  
develop  a  cognitive  model  of  the  experience  and  secondly,  to  get  the  
participant  to  undertake  a  task  that  utilizes  processes  from  the  model.      Both  
these  approaches  have  problems:  the  former  limits  the  generalizability  of  the  
findings.    This  approach  is  only  useful  to  the  study  of  those  who  have  insight  
into  their  experiences  (i.e.  are  aware,  for  example,  that  the  hallucination  is  
pathological),  or  those  who  can  clearly  demarcate  the  experience  of  interest  
from  others,  and  are  able  to  identify  it  reliably,  and  this  group  of  participants  
may  differ  systematically  from  those  who  lack  such  insight  or  discrimination.    
Further,  the  ‘capture’  method  relies  on  the  experience  being  temporally  and  
phenomenologically  discrete,  such  that  the  analysis  can  proceed  by  
categorizing  the  fMRI  signal  as  to  when  the  experience  is  present  or  absent.    
The  second  approach,  studying  psychopathology  using  a  cognitive  task  that  is  
thought  to  reflect  processes  that  underpin  the  experience,  relies  on  cognitive  
models  of  symptoms  existing,  and  on  a  deeper  assumption  that  it  is  correct  
that  psychopathological  states  are  the  results  of  quantitative  changes  from  
normal  cognitive  neuropsychological  processes,  as  opposed  to  the  idea  that  
mental  illness  may  be  accompanied  by  the  existence  of  new  mechanisms  and  
processes  that  underpin  symptom  formation.  A  more  scientific  problem  is  
that  the  analysis  of  such  tasks  typically  involves  the  method  of  ‘subtraction’  -­‐‑  
i.e.  the  activations  at  ‘rest’  are  subtracted  from  those  when  the  participant  is  
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‘active’  and  performing  the  task.    Hence,  creating  the  rest  or  control  task  is  
equally  as  important  as  creating  the  active  task,  and  needs  to  ensure  that  the  
only  element  of  the  tasks  that  differs  between  the  control  and  active  task  is  the  
element  under  investigation.    Returning  to  psychopathy,  if  the  researcher  
wishes  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  those  with  antisocial  personality  disorder  
tend  to  activate  areas  of  the  brain  associated  with  anger  when  they  view  
fearful  faces,  they  will  need  to  use  non-­‐‑fearful  faces  as  the  ‘rest  condition’  and  
also  ensure  that  the  same  degree  of  concentration,  attention,  visual  scan  etc.  is  
present  in  the  rest  as  the  active  condition.    
  
After  this  overview  of  the  methodology  and  difficulties  of  using  fMRI  to  
study  psychopathology,  the  paper  focuses  on  delusion.    Delusions  are  not  
discrete,  either  temporally  or  from  other  parts  of  the  mental  state  and  hence  
the  ‘capture’  approach  outlined  above  is  not  feasible.    The  instruction  ‘please  
press  this  button  when  deluded’  seems  unlikely  to  be  useful.      A  delusion  is  
suspected  when  certain  characteristics  of  a  belief  may  be  present–  such  as  
implausibility,  conviction,  being  unfounded,  distressing,  preoccupying,  or  not  
being  shared  by  others.    Further,  the  person  with  a  delusion  has  a  radically  
changed  experience  of  the  world  that  goes  beyond  the  mere  holding  of  a  false  
propositional  attitude.    I  argue  that  normative,  socially-­‐‑conditioned  rules  for  
linking  reasons,  causes,  and  explanations  are  disrupted  in  those  with  
psychosis  and  delusions,  and  hence,  and  linking  with  Paper  3  and  work  with  
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Bortolotti,  the  reasons  the  deluded  give  for  their  beliefs  either  do  not  look  
very  much  like  reasons  or  appear  to  be  not  very  good  reasons  when  presented  
to  another.  
  
The  chapter  then  examines  cognitive  models  of  delusion  formation  and  how  
they  have  been  examined  using  neuroimaging.    This  chapter  predates  the  
current  interest  in  prediction-­‐‑coding  models  of  delusions  and  hence  examines  
delusion  formation  with  reference  to  the  two-­‐‑step  model  of  delusions.    This  
model  views  delusions  as  being  consequent  upon  generation  of  an  anomalous  
experience  (step  one)  and  with  a  bias  or  deficit  in  reasoning  (step  two)  that  
impacts  upon  the  appraisal  and  explanation  of  the  experience.    The  biases  are  
viewed  as  constraining,  and  skewing,  the  search  for  explanations  of  the  
experience.  Hence,  on  this  account,  the  delusion  is  an  explanation  of  an  
unusual  experience.      
  
Reviewing  mechanisms  purported  to  underpin  Step  One,  the  chapter  
describes  the  work  of  Hemsley,  Gray  and  Kapur  who  draw  upon  dopamine’s  
role  in  generating  salience  for  events,  and  utilizes  PET  to  study  dopamine  in  
vivo.  For  those  with  psychosis,  there  is  elevated  mesolimbic  dopamine  and  its  
release  can  be  context-­‐‑independent.    Hence,  salience  can  be  granted  to  
otherwise  innocuous  events  and  stimuli.    Experientially,  this  may  lead  to  the  
person  having  the  experience  of  significance  and  novelty  of  previously  benign  
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or  unnoticed  events.    This  state  is  linked  to  previous  accounts  of  the  entry  into  
psychosis  and  the  phase  of  ‘delusional  mood’.    The  second  ‘anomalous  
experience’  reviewed  in  the  chapter  is  the  phenomenon  of  voice-­‐‑hearing.    
Functional  neuroimaging  has  been  used  to  great  effect  to  examine  Chris  
Frith’s  model  of  auditory  hallucinations,  namely  that  the  experience  of  voice-­‐‑
hearing  is  due  to  the  mis-­‐‑recognition  of  a  voice  as  externally  generated  when  
it  is  in  fact  self-­‐‑generated.  The  ‘alien  voices’  or  ‘self-­‐‑monitoring’  cognitive  task,  
and  its  use  in  the  scanner,  is  then  described.      
  
Following  on  from  this,  biases  thought  to  be  part  of  Step  Two  are  reviewed  
that  have  been  employed  in  neuroimaging  studies.    These  biases  include  the  
‘jumping  to  conclusions’  (JTC)  bias,  whereby  less  evidence  is  called  on  prior  
to  making  a  decision  in  a  probabilistic  reasoning  task,  the  externalizing  
attributional  bias  (a  neutral  or  self-­‐‑caused  negative  event  is  more  likely  to  be  
thought  to  be  externally  caused)  and  problems  in  social  cognition  and/or  
Theory  of  Mind  (here,  the  idea  is  that  an  individual  is  unable  to  determine  the  
intentions  of  another  towards  him  or  her  and  thus  posits  a  negative  intent).  
Imaging  may  be  used  to  study  the  formation  of  delusions  via  approaches  not  
tightly  linked  to  the  two  step  model,  for  example,  by  examining  the  role  of  
affect  in  delusions,  and  given  that  delusions  are  part  of  the  definition  of  a  
psychotic  episode,  how  imaging  has  characterized  illness  onset.      The  latter  
section  of  the  paper  reviews  important  findings  in  structural  neuroimaging  
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that  have  characterized  anatomical  changes  linked  to  onset  of  psychotic  
illness.  
  
The  chapter  ends  with  a  cautionary  note  concerning  the  likely  heterogeneity  
of  delusions  and  the  difficulty  in  providing  a  definition.    The  central  claim  of  
the  paper  is  that  if  the  nature  of  delusion  is  not  appreciated  fully,  then  any  
attempts  to  study  the  phenomenon  scientifically  will  be  at  best  partial.    I  
argue  that  perhaps  the  term  delusion  does  not  pick  out  a  discrete  
psychological  state  or  kind,  with  delusions  being  characterized  by  several  
continua.    These  include  things  like  plausibility,  distress,  conviction,  and  
sharedness.    Linking  back  to  issues  of  normativity  earlier  in  the  chapter,  I  
discuss  how  judgments  about  beliefs  being  on  these  continua  rely  on  
normative  criteria,  some  of  which  may  be  more  socially  constructed,  whereas  
others  may  be  more  linked  to  rationality  and  judgment,  and  that  
understanding  of  neuropsychology  and  brain  function  is  likely  to  interact  
with  these  processes  in  generating  the  clinical  phenomenon  of  delusion.  The  
scientific  study  of  delusion  thus  demonstrates  an  example  of  the  limitation  of  
the  cognitive  neuropsychiatric  paradigm,  an  exemplar  of  the  biological  
essentialist  approach,  in  studying  psychopathology.  Further,  given  the  role  of  
psychological  continua  in  constituting  delusions,  rationality,  judgment,  and  
social  norms,  McDowell’s  conceptual  capacities  and  features  of  the  second  
natures,  are  needed  to  study  this  area  of  psychopathology  adequately.  
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Paper  3:  A  role  for  ownership  and  authorship  in  the  analysis  of  thought  
insertion  
This  paper  was  co-­‐‑written  with  Lisa  Bortolotti  and  links  to  the  prior  papers  in  
that  it  utilizes  concepts  such  as  intentionality,  rationality,  and  self-­‐‑knowledge,  
together  with  the  work  of  the  philosopher  Moran,  to  analyse  the  passivity  
experience  and  delusion  of  thought  insertion.  Specifically,  it  takes  forward  a  
theme  from  paper  2:  it  is  not  by  analysing  a  brain  scan  that  one  determines  the  
presence  of  delusions,  but  rather  by  talking  with  someone  or  observing  their  
behaviour.    The  paper  looks  at  a  particular  psychotic  experience  and  delusion  
of  interest  to  philosophers,  thought  insertion.  The  central  claim  of  the  paper  is  
that  the  prior  philosophical  analyses  of  the  phenomenon  of  thought  insertion  
have  either  failed  to  grasp  the  experience  correctly,  or  have  failed  to  
demarcate  thought  insertion  wholly  from  other  areas  of  psychopathology,  
including  passivity  of  action,  and  some  normal  mental  states.    This  paper  
focuses  on  issues  of  self-­‐‑ascription  and  why  that  is  needed  alongside  other  
facets  (spatiality,  introspection,  interpretation  of  behaviour)  to  characterise  
what  is  so  perplexing  and  distressing  about  thought  insertion.  Thought  
insertion  offers  philosophers  a  real  world  example  of  a  thought  that  is  inside  
one’s  head,  can  be  introspected  yet  is  neither  owned,  self-­‐‑ascribed,  nor  
endorsed.  	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  Claims	  of	  the	  paper:	  	   1. Previous	  philosophical	  analyses	  of	  thought	  insertion	  have	  been	  unsuccessful.	  2. An	  account	  that	  draws	  on	  the	  ownership	  and	  authorship	  of	  thoughts	  alongside	  introspection	  and	  self-­‐interpretation	  is	  required.	  3. Reason	  giving	  and	  authorship	  supplement	  self	  knowledge	  obtained	  by	  introspection	  and	  interpretation	  of	  behavior	  and	  aid	  self-­‐ascription	  of	  thoughts.	  4. Thought	  insertion	  is	  where	  introspection	  and	  spatiality	  conditions	  are	  met,	  yet	  ownership	  is	  not	  present	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  authorship.	  	  However,	  the	  secondary	  delusional	  belief	  explaining	  the	  inserted	  thought	  may	  be	  authored.	  5. Those  with  thought  insertion  have  a  breakdown  of  a  capacity  relevant  
to  judgments  of  first  person  authority  and  rationality	  
  
One  can  know  one’s  own  beliefs  and  attitudes  by  two  main  means:  one  we  
term  ‘epistemic’,  and  is  due  to  direct  access  and  introspection  as  well  as  self  
interpretation  of  one’s  own  behavior.    This  ‘epistemic  route’  can  be  
supplemented  by  ‘self-­‐‑ascription’  of  thoughts,  and  this  self-­‐‑ascription  utilizes  
the  notions  of  ownership  and  authorship  of  thoughts  (Bortolotti,  2009).  One  is  
usually  in  a  condition  to  self-­‐‑ascribe  those  thoughts  that  can  be  accessed  
directly  or  inferred  from  one’s  own  behaviour,  and  ownership  is  one’s  
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capacity  to  acknowledge  a  thought  as  one’s  own  which  leads  to  ascribing  the  
thought  to  oneself.    Ownership  is  achieved  on  the  basis  of  epistemic  access  to  
the  content  of  one’s  own  thoughts,  with  thought  insertion  serving  as  an  
important  exception.  Self-­‐‑ascription  can  also  be  attained  via  using  other  
capacities:    in  some  circumstances,  one  can  ascribe  a  thought  to  oneself  on  the  
basis  of  an  act  of  authorship.    One  is  the  author  of  a  thought  if  one  forms  it  or  
justifies  it  on  the  basis  of  what  one  takes  to  be  one’s  best  reasons.    Reason  
giving  is  thus  linked  to  the  ability  to  be  authors  of  thoughts  and  hence  self-­‐‑
ascription.    This  account  forms  the  basis  of  Claim  2  and  3.  
  
The  paper  begins  to  apply  some  of  these  distinctions  to  psychopathology  and  
opens  with  a  discussion  of  reason-­‐‑giving  in  delusions  generally,  and  suggests  
that  those  with  persecutory  delusions  can  be  both  the  owner  and  the  author  of  
their  beliefs:  they  typically  will  claim  their  belief  as  their  own  and  ascribe  it  to  
themselves,  and  can  also  demonstrate  authorship  by  offering  reasons  to  
support  it.    For  example,  a  patient  with  a  persecutory  delusion  may  defend  
their  belief  that  they  are  under  threat  from  government  assassins  with  a  
further  belief  that  their  life  is  in  risk  due  to  them  knowing  the  secret  
conspiracy.  Many  of  those  with  typical  delusions  can  be  both  the  owners  and  
the  authors  of  these  thoughts.  This  may  not  be  so  clear  in  other  cases  of  
delusions.  The  purpose  here  to  make  clear  that  not  all  delusions  are  the  same,  
and  that  thought  insertion  itself  is  usually  a  two-­‐‑stage  phenomenon  (the  
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experience  of  the  inserted  thought,  and  then  delusional  elaboration  as  to  how  
it  arose)  The  paper  suggests  that  considering  ownership  and  authorship  in  
psychopathology  is  important  as  the  cognitive  neuropsychiatric  paradigm  of  
research  relates  delusions  to  normal  beliefs  and  assumes  the  presence  of  
ownership  and  authorship,  yet  both  of  these  are  important  to  determine  the  
ascription  of  intentionality  and  self  knowledge  and  may  be  lacking  in  key  
psychotic  experiences.    Although  many  delusions  do  feature  endorsement,  
reason  giving  and  authorship,  some  do  not  (see  Bortolotti  and  Broome,  2008).    
An  example  would  be  a  primary  delusion  where  a  given  delusional  belief  is  
held  incorrigibly  but  no  reason  can  be  given  as  to  why  the  person  believes  
what  they  do  (“I  just  know  that  I  am  the  next  Messiah,  doctor”).  Such  a  belief  
state  is  not  authored.    With  belief  states  that  are  not  owned  nor  authored,  they  
are  less  able  to  be  integrated  into  a  wider  narrative  conception  and  further,  
and  those  isolated  abnormal  beliefs  may  engender  certain  societal  attitudes.    
Patients  with  such  beliefs  can  be  aware  that  they  cannot  integrate  these  
thoughts  into  wider  narratives  and  after  being  met  with  bafflement  and  
perplexity,  frequently  withdraw  and  give  up  on  communication  with  others.  
  
Thought  insertion  is  an  important  symptom  of  mental  illness,  and  is  listed  as  
one  of  Schneider’s  First  Rank  Symptoms  of  Schizophrenia.    This  list  was  
thought  to  indicate  certain  key  symptoms  that  were  pathognomic  of  
schizophrenia,  in  the  absence  of  brain  disease.  However,  subsequently  these  
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symptoms  have  been  shown  to  be  less  diagnostically  specific  (they  can  occur  
in  a  manic  psychosis,  for  example)  and  the  latest  iteration  of  the  DSM  doesn’t  
weight  Schneider’s  symptoms  differentially  in  the  diagnosis  of  schizophrenia.        
  
In  addressing  Claim  1,  the  paper  discusses  conventional  characterizations  of  
thought  insertion.  The  paper  argues  that  in  these  accounts  ownership  of  
thoughts  in  the  philosophy  literature  has  been  defined  in  two  ways.    First,  by  
what  we  term  the  spatiality  and  introspection  condition,  that  is  to  say,  the  
thought  is  within  one’s  spatial  boundaries  and  can  be  accessed  directly  and  
first-­‐‑personally.    Secondly,  that  ownership  should  be  considered  as  being  due  
to  both  the  introspection  condition  and  self-­‐‑ascription  condition  –  
acknowledging  the  thought  as  one’s  own.    We  suggest  that  for  thought  
insertion  previous  accounts  are  incorrect  as  they  tend  to  assume  that  
ownership  goes  along  with  the  introspection  and  spatiality  conditions:  we  
argue  that  it  is  in  thought  insertion  precisely  where  they  dissociate.    Those  
with  inserted  thought  can  introspect  their  contents,  believe  they  occur  within  
their  personal  space  but  will  fail  to  self-­‐‑ascribe  and  own.  In  these  accounts,  
ownership  has  been  characterized  previously  based  around  a  spatial  
condition  (“this  thought,  that  is  not  mine,  is  in  my  head”),  coupled  with  direct  
access,  and  hence  a  swift  move  is  made  to  ownership  without  explicit  
consideration  of  self-­‐‑ascription.    It  could,  instead,  be  seen  that  the  core,  
primary  experience  of  thought  insertion  is  that  an  ‘episode  of  thinking’  has  
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occurred  in  one’s  mental  life  but  which  one  does  not  ascribe  to  oneself,  
despite  the  criteria  of  the  thinking  being  amenable  to  introspection  and  
occurring  within  one’s  spatial  boundaries.    Thus  thought  insertion  serves  as  
an  important  real  life  counter  example  where  ownership  is  absent  despite  first  
person  introspective  access  and  hence  a  failure  of  self-­‐‑ascription.    It  is  this  
feeling  of  alien  intrusion,  what  used  to  be  termed  ‘disturbance  of  ego  
boundaries’,  and  lack  of  privacy  in  one’s  mental  life,  that  can  make  psychosis  
so  distressing  and  is  not  captured  in  prior  accounts  of  thought  insertion.    In  
addition  to  the  problem  of  ownership,  we  also  discuss  how  the  spatiality  
conception  of  thought  itself  is  somewhat  problematic  more  generally  in  that  it  
relies  on  a  dubious  metaphorical  conception  of  mental  life  and  psychology,  
‘mind  as  a  spatial  container’,  that  may  not  be  an  accurate  guide  to  the  
epistemology  and  metaphysics  of  thought.  
  
Moran’s  work  is  useful  due  to  his  notion  of  being  a  deliberator  –  there  is  
something  special  about  first  person  narrative  accounts,  as  the  process  of  
reason  giving  for  actions  and  choices  demonstrates  that  one  has  come  to  a  
decision  based  upon  considering  the  best  reasons,  deliberating.      Through  this  
mechanism,  the  deliberator  has  first  person  authority  over  the  content  of  the  
decision  via  reflecting  on  the  reasons  that  led  to  it.    As  mentioned  earlier,  
Moran  suggests  authorship  supplements  self  knowledge  as  being  an  
additional  means  of  knowing  one  self  alongside  direct  access  and  self-­‐‑
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interpretation  of  behavior.    Reason  giving  offers  an  additional  route  to  
knowledge  of  the  content  of  one’s  mental  states  and  to  the  knowledge  that  
one  has  mental  states  with  that  content.      
  
   If  it  is  possible  for  a  person  to  answer  a  deliberative  question  about  his  belief  at  
all,  this  involves  assuming  an  authority  over,  and  a  responsibility  for,  what  his  belief  
actually  is.  Thus  a  person  able  to  exercise  this  capacity  is  in  a  position  to  declare  what  
his  belief  is  by  reflection  on  the  reasons  in  favor  of  that  belief,  rather  than  by  
examination  of  the  psychological  evidence.  In  this  way  .  .  .  avowal  can  be  seen  as  an  
expression  of  genuine  self-­‐‑knowledge.  (Moran,  2004,  p.  425)  
  
Of  course,  deliberation  and  authorship  does  not  apply  equally  to  all  conscious  
mental  states,  and  there  can  be  degrees,  for  example  the  degree  of  deliberation  
employed  regarding  breakfast  choice  or  course  of  study  at  university,  as  well  
as  beliefs  that  are  accepted  and  not  deliberated  upon  (for  example,  believing  
climate  change  is  irreversible  without  examining  the  reasons  for  that  claim).    
Failure  of  authorship,  where  it  should  be  present,  can  be  seen  as  evidence  of  
lack  of  self-­‐‑knowledge  and/or  an  obstacle  to  ascribing  intentional  behavior  
and  rationality  to  the  individual.    The  notion  of  authorship  we  are  primarily  
concerned  with  is  one  of  endorsement,  measured  by  capacity  for  reason  
giving.    Using  Moran,  we  can  see  that  for  the  experience  of  thought  insertion,  
the  inserted  thought  itself  is  likely  to  be  non-­‐‑authored  and  not  endorsed  –  it  
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will  be  rather  like  a  perceptual  belief  –  whereas  the  delusional  belief  that  
explains  the  inserted  thought  may  well  be  authored,  along  the  lines  of  other  
persecutory  delusions.    This  analysis  captures  the  uncanny  experience  of  
thought  insertion  –  the  experience  of  a  thought  in  one’s  own  head  (spatiality  
condition),  that  one  can  access  via  introspection  (first  person  access),  yet  is  not  
owned  or  authored.    Hence,  this  additional  route  of  self  knowledge  is  absent  
in  the  case  of  thought  insertion  (Claim  4).  
  
  
The  paper  then  reviews  the  psychopathology  of  thought  insertion  and  
disorders  of  the  self,  and  distinguishes  between  beliefs  about  control  or  
insertion  of  thoughts  by  a  third  party,  and  the  thought  itself.    Thought  
insertion  is  one  of  a  wider  group  of  passivity  experiences  that  occur  in  
psychotic  illnesses  and  a  strength  of  our  account  is  that  it  allows  thought  
insertion  to  be  differentiated  from  other  passivity  experience.    Passivity,  in  
psychiatry,  refers  to  a  group  of  experiences  typically  seen  in  schizophrenia.  
They  include  passivity  of  thought,  of  action,  and  of  emotion,  with  the  
unifying  feature  that  these  actions,  thoughts,  or  emotions  arise  without  the  
involvement  of  the  person  who  experiences  them.  As  mentioned  above,  
thought  insertion  is  typically  a  dual  experience:    the  passivity  experience  (a  
thought  that  is  not  mine)  and  the  delusional  explanation  (this  has  entered  my  
head  due  to  MI6).    Thought  insertion  typically  covers  these  two  elements  but  
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it  is  with  the  former  element,  the  thought  being  other  than  mine,  that  raises  
issues  of  ownership  and  authorship.    As  mentioned  above,  the  latter  
delusional  elaboration  may  well  be  authored.  The  subject  will  know  the  
inserted  thought  first  personally  and  have  direct  access  to  it,  but  it  will  feel  
alien  or  not  under  control.    Hence,  there  is  a  disjunction  between  first  person,  
introspective,  access  and  self-­‐‑ascription.    We  argue,  contra  Gallagher  and  
Gerrans,  who  rely  on  a  spatiality  conception  of  ownership,  based  upon  
location  and  first  person  access,  and  suggest,  with  Campbell,  that  instead  the  
subject  does  not  own  the  thought:  they  have  direct  access  and  it  is  ‘in  their  
head’,  but  it  is  not  theirs  as  it  is  not  self-­‐‑ascribed.    In  addition  to  our  concerns  
about  linking  ownership  to  spatiality,  we  also  argue  that  the  absence  of  
ownership  and  self  ascription  seems  to  ring  true  with  the  puzzling  and  
distressing  features  of  thought  insertion,  namely,  that  one  can  introspect  a  
thought  without  acknowledging  it  as  one’s  own.    Thought  insertion  hence  
becomes  characterized  by  a  lack  of  ownership  as  defined  by  absence  of  self-­‐‑
ascription.    This  feature  distinguishes  thought  insertion  from  other  areas  of  
psychopathology.  Unlike  passivity  of  motor  action,  or  alien  hand  syndrome,  it  
is  not  the  organ  or  body  part  that  is  not  owned,  but  the  process.    In  thought  
insertion  you  do  not  fail  to  acknowledge  that  the  brain  is  yours  because  it  has  
engaged  in  an  act  of  thinking  that  was  not  willed  by  you.  Rather,  you  explain  
that  others  are  using  your  brain  and  take  distance  from  the  product  of  that  
thinking  activity,  ascribing  it  to  someone  else.    Ownership  and  authorship  are  
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the  end  product  of  deliberating  on  the  reasons  for  a  belief  and  this  
deliberation  will  not  occur  for  individual  inserted  thoughts  –  this  is  similar  to  
deliberation  as  not  occurring  as  part  of  our  experience  of  individual  
perceptual-­‐‑driven  beliefs.  
  
We  then  move  to  relate  the  passivity  of  thought  with  the  passivity  of  agency  
that  can  also  occur  in  psychotic  illnesses.  In  passivity  of  thought,  there  is  a  
thought  being  thought  that  one  has  not  thought,  in  passivity  of  action,  one’s  
body  can  move  but  the  move  has  not  been  initiated  or  generated  by  the  
person.    Thought  insertion  is  a  subtype  of  passivity  as  it  carries  the  extra  claim  
that  not  only  is  there  a  thought  in  our  heads  that  is  not  ours,  but  that  it  has  
been  inserted  from  without  by  some  kind  of  agency.  Our  analysis,  we  argue,  
can  allow  us  to  distinguish  between:  (a)  delusions  of  passivity  and  ordinary  
beliefs  when  they  are  formed  in  absence  of  explicit  deliberation;  (b)  the  role  of  
intentional  causation  and  production  in  disorders  of  activity  and  in  disorders  
of  thinking;  (c)  the  phenomenology  of  thought  insertion  and  that  of  delusions  
of  control  with  respect  to  thoughts.  Moreover,  this  account  can  make  sense  of  
the  claim  that  thought  insertion  is  a  failure  of  self-­‐‑knowledge  independently  
of  a  reference  to  the  breach  of  personal  boundaries.    The  loss  of  agency  
account  fails  to  distinguish  between  thought  insertion  and  some  ordinary  
beliefs,  such  as  spontaneous  thoughts  that  come  to  mind  without  deliberation.    
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Agency  is  lacking,  but  there  is  no  delusional  elaboration  regarding  insertion.    
Passivity  regarding  thought  formation  cannot  be  at  the  core  of  the  
phenomenology  of  thought  insertion.    However,  such  spontaneously  arising  
thoughts  are  self-­‐‑ascribed.  Our  account  also  allows  distinctions  to  be  drawn  
within  unusual  thought  experiences  –  such  as  between  thought  insertion  and  
control,  again,  self  ascription  helps  as  in  thought  control  the  thoughts  remain  
mine,  even  if  under  external  control.    What  distinguishes  thought  insertion  is  
the  violation  of  self-­‐‑ascription  and  typically  a  failure  of  authorship.    The  
paper  concludes  that  those  with  thought  insertion  have  a  breakdown  of  a  
capacity  relevant  to  judgements  of  first  person  authority  and  rationality  
(Claim  5).    Clinically,  the  issue  is  of  importance  as  patients  may  have  unusual,  
distressing  thoughts  that  they  are  able  to  self-­‐‑ascribe  despite  being  highly  
upsetting  and  disabling  (for  example,  obsessions).    This  raises  the  point  that  
causal  generation  is  not  so  much  the  issue  in  delineating  psychopathology  as  
self-­‐‑ascription  –  the  obsessive  has  little  control  over  his  obsessive  ruminations  
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Paper  4:  Philosophical  Issues  in  the  Prodromal  Phase  of  Psychosis  
This  paper  was  part  of  a  special  issue  of  a  journal  devoted  to  the  topic  of  the  
prodromal  phase  of  psychosis.    A  central  claim  of  the  paper  is  that  the  
prodromal  phase  of  illness  is  not  a  discrete,  well-­‐‑demarcated  period  in  the  
course  of  illness,  a  view  held  by  clinicians  and  researchers  who  question  
continuum  accounts  of  psychosis,  and  view  psychosis  as  have  a  clear  early  
trajectory  from  pre-­‐‑illness  to  onset.    Indeed,  on  one  hand  the  nature  of  the  
prodrome  of  psychosis  is  challenged  by  the  continuum  model  of  psychosis  
and  those  who  have  psychotic  experiences  yet  are  not  at  risk  of  developing  
illness,  and  on  the  other  hand  by  the  somewhat  arbitrary  nature  of  the  
definition  of  transition  from  prodrome  to  frank  illness  and  the  reliance  on  
assessing  positive  symptoms  to  make  that  judgement.    The  paper  discusses  
several  inter-­‐‑related  philosophical  themes:  these  include  issues  of  the  nature  
of  the  prodrome,  and  how  this  was  conceived  both  in  terms  of  full-­‐‑blown  
psychotic  illness,  but  also  continuum  models  of  psychosis.    The  paper  also  
discusses  how  one  can  study  the  prodrome  purely  using  neuroscience  and  
hence  links  with  themes  in  papers  1  and  2  particularly.    Finally,  the  paper  
discusses  the  ethics  of  screening  and  monitoring  those  who  have  not  as  yet  
developed  an  illness,  and  some  of  the  debates  regarding  the  inclusion  of  the  
prodromal  phase  in  the,  at  that  time  unpublished,  DSM5.  
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The  paper  opens  with  an  overview  of  the  neurodevelopmental  model  of  
schizophrenia,  linking  the  prodromal  phase  to  early  developmental  changes  
noted  in  cohorts  at  childhood  who  may  go  on  to  develop  schizophrenia  as  
young  adults.    The  prodromal  phase  of  psychosis  is  characterized  by  
psychotic  experiences  that  are  insufficiently  intense,  frequent  or  distressing  to  
meet  diagnostic  criteria  –  yet,  having  these  experiences  may  predict  the  onset  
of  frank  illness  within  the  next  6-­‐‑12  months.    However,  there  are  also  people  
who  have  psychotic  experiences  yet  who  are  not  distressed,  do  not  need  
services,  and  who  do  not  develop  a  psychotic  illness.    A  crucial  issue  for  the  
early  identification  of  psychotic  illness  is  how  to  distinguish  an  individual  
who  may  be  at  risk  of  developing  the  illness,  based  upon  their  experiences,  
from  an  individual  who  may  have  similar  experiences  yet  not  be  at  risk  of  
developing  the  illness.    Hence,  one  of  the  critiques  of  the  prodromal  high-­‐‑risk  
research  strategy  is  that  these  two  groups  get  mixed  up  or  perhaps  are  not  
distinguishable.    In  the  paper,  we  introduce  the  notion  of  the  ‘at  risk  mental  
state’  (ARMS),  a  mental  state  determined  by  a  semi-­‐‑structured  interview  that  
predicts  the  onset  of  psychosis  and  as  such  is  a  prospective  means  to  aid  the  
identification  of  those  who  may  be  in  the  prodromal  phase  of  illness,  and  we  
argue  that  the  ARMS  is  a  segment  of  the  continuum  of  psychosis.    Individuals  
in  this  segment  have  the  psychotic  experiences  of  the  members  of  those  with  
benign  experiences  on  the  continuum,  but  will  have  additional  risk  factors,  
some  of  which  will  be  demographic  but  others  may  be  linked  to  drug  use,  
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trauma,  and  comorbid  psychopathology  such  as  anxiety  and  depression.    We  
then  discuss  sampling  concerns  and  how  much  service  design  contributes  to  
risk  of  psychosis  rather  than  symptoms  and  clinical  presentation.  
  
The  discussion  moves  on  to  criticize  the  neurodevelopmental  model  as  failing  
to  explain  the  onset  of  psychosis  in  late  adolescence/early  adulthood,  given  its  
focus  on  risk  factors  in  very  early  life,  rather  than  factors  more  proximal  to  the  
transition  to  frank  psychosis  onset.    The  relatively  arbitrary  nature  of  this  
transition  is  noted  and  that  certain  symptoms  are  used  to  determine  onset.  
This  demonstrates  how  crucial  in  the  current  measures  key  positive  
symptoms,  such  as  hallucinations  and  delusions,  are  in  indexing  onset.    The  
standardized  research  tools  used  to  define  the  onset  of  psychosis  largely  do  
this  by  measuring  positive  symptoms  and  their  intensity.  Once  they  have  
reached  a  certain  level  (typically  defined  by  their  intensity,  belief  in  their  
reality,  and  the  concomitant  distress  caused)  and  by  their  duration  (at  least  
one  week)  then  the  threshold  for  a  first  episode  of  psychosis  is  met.  Somewhat  
paradoxically,  there  can  be  profound  neuropsychological  and  functional  
impairment  without  the  threshold  to  psychosis  having  been  crossed.  
  
We  then  argue,  based  upon  arbitrariness  of  transition  and  relation  to  the  
continuum  of  psychosis,  that  first  episode  of  psychosis  may  not  be  able  to  be  
defined  narrowly  using  biological,  psychological,  or  clinical  criteria.  This  
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leads  to  thinking  of  psychosis  as  a  collection  of  continua,  rather  than  as  
discrete  stages,  and  that  it  may  be  more  useful  if  we  employ  normativity  to  
define  psychopathology.    The  paper  utilizes  some  arguments  made  in  Paper  2  
around  delusions  and  their  dependence  on  a  variety  of  dimensions.    Further,  
that  delusions  are  only  recognizable  as  disorders  of  behavior  and  
communication,  referenced  to  norms,  rather  than  as  distinct  invariant  
neuroscientific  or  psychological  kinds.      What  is  pathological  in  delusion  
cannot  be  captured  by  purely  biological  investigations  such  as  a  brain  scan.    
We  broaden  some  of  these  criticisms  by  addressing  non-­‐‑biological  features  
linked  to  psychosis  and  the  return  of  social  psychiatry.    The  paper  reviews  the  
important  AESOP  study,  as  well  as  ecological  studies  of  psychotic  experiences  
and  the  urban  environment  and  suggests  that  external  factors  to  the  brain  are  
important  in  the  genesis  of  psychosis.    Here,  the  paper  draws  on  Andy  Clark’s  
notion  of  ‘the  extended  mind’  and  vehicle  or  active  externalism.    A  key  idea  is  
that  objects  external  to  the  physical  boundary  of  the  body  can  serve  as  a  
functional  part  of  the  mind,  and  should  be  considered  as  such.    The  mind  is  
extended  outside  of  the  body  and  into  the  world.    An  example  given  would  
be  the  role  a  notepad  and  pencil  may  serve  in  carrying  out  arithmetic:  the  
notepad  and  pencil  are  part  of  the  mind  when  the  individual  undertakes  
arithmetic.      To  carry  this  idea  into  psychosis,  one  could  suggest  that  when  
reasoning  about  threat  to  oneself  certain  features  in  the  external  world  are  
used.    Features  such  as  busy  crowds,  traffic  noise,  and  other  features  of  urban  
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life  may  act  as  the  notepad  and  pencil  in  subserving,  and  guiding,  the  
reasoning  about  threat  to  oneself.    Hence,  structural  external  features  of  the  
world  may  be  part  of  a  mind  that  becomes  psychotic.  
  
The  paper  then  moves  to  clinical  and  ethical  implications  of  studying  the  
prodromal  phase.    We  review  issues  around  stigmatization  and  the  risk  that  
clinical  monitoring  may  itself  cause  anxiety  in  a  patient,  anxiety  that  may  
itself  lead  to  an  increase  in  the  intensity  of  psychotic  experiences  and  hence  
theoretically  hasten  the  onset  of  psychotic  illness.    Here,  screening  for  
psychosis  is  different  to  other  screening  programs  in  medicine  as  the  anxiety  
caused  by  the  screening  may  be  causally  potent  in  causing  the  illness  being  
screened  for.  This  concern  is  linked  to  the  debate  active  at  the  time  of  the  
writing  of  the  paper  regarding  the  inclusion  of  an  ‘attenuated  psychosis  
syndrome’  in  the  DSM5,  and  we  offer  some  reasons  against  inclusion  of  the  
syndrome  in  the  main  body  of  the  manual.  
  
The  paper  ends  by  discussing  a  clinical  staging  model  of  psychosis  that  may  
help  in  leading  clinicians  in  titrating  their  interventions  and  guiding  risk-­‐‑
benefit  analyses  for  clinicians  and  concludes  by  reiterating  a  view  expressed  
in  other  papers  that  psychological  notions  that  impact  on  rationality  and  self  
knowledge  are  crucial  for  identifying  mental  states  as  pathological  and  how  
features  of  the  external  environment  may  also  impact  on  such  social,  moral  
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and  epistemic  norms.    As  well  as  studying  the  brain,  studying  continua  of  
experience,  epidemiology  and  normativity  is  also  needed  to  understand  
psychosis  in  a  way  that  does  justice  to  the  complexity  of  the  phenomenon.  
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Intersections  between  the  publications  
The  papers  detailed  above  relate  to  my  empirical  and  clinical  work  as  set  out  
in  the  Introduction.    However,  there  are  also  connections  between  them  and  
other  philosophical  publications  of  mine.    One  of  the  over-­‐‑arching  themes  of  
the  papers  is  an  attempt  to  offer  a  form  of  realism  about  psychiatric  illness  
and  psychopathology  that  doesn’t  equate  such  disorders  and  symptoms  
wholly  to  neuroscience.    This  view  has  been  detailed  in  subsequent  
publications  (Broome  and  Bortolotti  2009,  2010).    Paper  1  begins  some  of  this  
work  in  surveying  various  ways  of  thinking  of  mental  disorders  and  offers  a  
realist  conception  of  mental  illness,  drawing  on  McDowell,  which  relies  on  an  
enriched  conception  of  nature  that  includes  our  second  nature  and  conceptual  
schemes.    On  this  account,  mental  disorder  can  be  seen  to  be  real  and  part  of  
its    reality  is  a  change  in  the  ‘space  of  reasons’.    Paper  2  takes  forward  this  
strategy  and  applies  the  approach  to  a  specific  area  of  psychopathology.  The  
chapter  focuses  on  the  role  imaging  can  play  in  studying  delusions  and  links  
with  paper  1  as  it  discusses  elements  of  delusion  that  may  not  be  amenable  to  
the  cognitive  neuropsychiatric  paradigm  as  simply  applied.    The  thought  here  
is  that  what  makes  delusions  pathological  relates  to  more  socially  normative  
criteria  about  what  interlocutors  find  to  be  normal  or  abnormal  beliefs,  and  
the  role  rationality  plays  in  how  we  judge  the  reasons  people  give  for  holding  
those  beliefs.    A  delusion  is  identified  by  speaking  with  someone,  rather  than  
by  studying  a  brain  scan.    Paper  3  is  a  partner  paper  to  another  published  
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with  Bortolotti  (Bortolotti  and  Broome,  2008)  that  goes  into  greater  detail  as  to  
the  reasons  the  deluded  give  for  holding  their  beliefs  and  how  such  reason-­‐‑
giving  relates  to  self-­‐‑knowledge.    Paper  3  takes  forward  one  of  the  key  points  
from  paper  2  -­‐‑  that  it  is  in  talking  to  someone,  and  listening  to  the  reasons  that  
they  give  for  their  beliefs,  that  psychopathology  and  mental  disorder  is  
manifest.    In  this  paper,  the  symptom  of  Thought  Insertion  is  specifically  
focused  on.    Paper  4  draws  together  many  of  the  themes  detailed  in  the  prior  
publications  as  it  seeks  to  examine  the  prodromal  phase  of  psychosis  in  
relation  to  both  the  neurodevelopmental  account  of  schizophrenia  and  the  
continuum  model  of  psychosis.    It  stresses  the  seemingly  arbitrary  nature  of  
demarcations  between  different  stages  of  psychosis  and  illness,  and  how  such  
stages  (echoing  back  to  paper  1,  and  2)  are  unlikely  to  be  wholly  cashed  out  
purely  neuroscienticifically.  These  are  not  trivial  issues:  how  one  defines  
stages  of  psychopathology  –  and  differentiates  someone  who  is  at  risk  of  
psychosis,  from  an  individual  who  has  unusual  experiences  that  are  not  
distressing  and  from  someone  who  has  developed  the  disorder  -­‐‑  are  hugely  
important  in  terms  of  titrating  treatment,  commencing  medication,  predicting  
prognosis,  managing  risk  to  the  individual,  and  determining  responsibility  
for  action.    On  this  latter  point,  some  legal  jurisdictions  view  the  diagnosis  of  
psychosis  as  necessarily  abrogating  the  individual  from  criminal  
responsibility,  regardless  of  the  nature  of  the  connections  between  their  
experiences  and  the  offence.  
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The  thesis  as  a  whole  revolves  around  several  interconnected  themes:    the  
realism  of  the  mental,  its  irreducibility,  and  the  importance  of  normatively  
constituted  mental  life  in  thinking  about  psychiatric  disorders  and  
psychopathology.    As  can  be  seen,  the  work  of  McDowell  has  been  an  
influence  in  my  approach,  particularly  his  conception  of  a  wider  view  of  
nature.    The  papers  have  led  to  further  work  not  presented  in  the  thesis  that  
develops  some  of  these  ideas  further,  including  papers  detailing  Jaspers’  
discussions  of  understanding  psychopathology  ‘psychically’  or  ‘somatically’  
(Broome,  2013),  the  relationship  between  neuroscience,  diagnosis,  and  
criminal  responsibility  (Bortolotti,  Broome  and  Mameli,  2013)  as  well  as  
examining  the  phenomenological  tradition  in  psychopathology  in  relation  to  
contemporary  neuroscientific  psychiatry  (Broome  et  al.,  2013).  Finally,  since  
my  initial  empirical  work  into  delusions,  Bayesian  approaches  to  delusions,  
and  psychosis  more  generally,  have  become  a  large  part  of  the  research  
program  and  I  am  developing  studies  both  philosophically  and  empirically  
with  Lisa  Bortolotti  and  colleagues  in  Oxford  into  how  these  approaches  
relate  to  the  prior  ‘two  factor’  model  of  delusional  formation,  and  to  the  onset  
of  psychosis.
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